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South Africa is again passing through a phase of open violence.
News of over thirty people killed in township unrest in the 
Vaal Triangle has come amidst accounts of spreading school boy­
cotts, of simmering tensions between Inkatha and UDF-linked 
groupings in the Durban area and an unprecedented spate of 
sabotage of government installations and some private homes in 
townships.
Reactions to these events are predictable. Anxious or gleeful 
forecasts of impending political conflagration will once again 
gain a gloss of credibility until the South African security 
firehoses once again douse the most visible flames. The govern­
ment and some of the media will blame activists and agitators, 
and all sorts of opposition groupings will blame government policy. 
Both will be right as usual. Nothing much will alter and life 
will grind on until the next rash of unrest. History is likely 
to go on repeating itself.
The tension of unresolved conflict in South Africa and its sporadic 
but tragic eruptions perhaps demands more than most of the 
analyses and prescriptions which the popular liberal and radical 
debate peddles to converted audiences. If we are serious about 
peaceful change we should perhaps try to rethink assumptions 
about change and search for new possibilities of being effective. 
This analysis is one of such attempts. It certainly does not 
pretend to have all the answers but hopefully may help to stimu­
late the thinking in reform circles which appears to be so 
urgently required.
In this assessment two major questions will be posed. Firstly, 
is South Africa on a path of reform and change which is likely 
to accumulate to ensure peace, stability and development in the 
future? Secondly, are the activities and organisations which 
are aimed at encouraging appropriate forms of change becoming 
more effective in achieving their goals? These are questions
which the South African Institute of Race Relations, as one 
of the foremost "change organisations" over the past 50 years, 
must pose pertinently and prominently as often as it can.
1. Change: The Key Issues.
In a recent nation-wide sample survey among 550 African indus­
trial workers, this author posed a simple question which went 
as follows: "Think of the present time in South Africa - every­
thing that is happening. Is life for you improving, staying the 
same or getting worse?" The proportions of the African workers 
who felt that life-chances were improving, staying constant or 
deteriorating were 16 percent, 24 percent and 60 percent res­
pectively. This no more than confirms many other impressions 
that a majority of blacks feel that conditions are deteriorating. 
At a time of recession this is perhaps only to be expected, 
and nearly all the people interviewed in the survey mentioned 
economic factors and unemployment. Over 50 percent of those who 
felt that life chances were deteriorating, however, also mentioned 
political concerns and government policy towards Africans in 
giving reasons for their answers. The housing shortage was 
another very prominent factor. The final test of policy is its 
impact on ordinary people and in South Africa today reform has 
not yet penetrated adequately to the rank and file.
The following seem to be key aspects of the problem. Influx 
control, although liberalised to some extent for people with 
urban rights in the wake of the Riekert Commission proposals, 
still requires Africans to grapple with officialdom and 
bureaucratic red tape in organising their lives. The mode of 
operation of the pass laws still creates the overwhelming 
impression that life chances are at the mercy of an organisation 
which, despite changes in its name, has consistently operated 
like a vast "compound management" in urban African life over 
the past twenty years.
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For Africans without urban rights, recent Appeal Court 
judgements have no more than re-established a right which 
existed until 1968; the right to earn urban rights through 
long and faithful service in urban employment. Here again the 
right can only be claimed after grappling with what some would 
term a highly resistant bureaucracy.
The crux of the problem of African administration in the common 
area lies in the fact that bureaucratic regulations can still 
criminalise individuals who are doing no more than seeking to 
optimise their life chances. Pass law arrests continue at a 
high level in a society whose leadership has recently taken 
to reaffirming its commitment to a private enterprise system 
with almost boring regularity. Free enterprise, however, is 
almost as remote today for the ordinary African wishing to 
sell his or her labour and establish a residence as it ever 
has been.
African local government and local planning and development in 
black areas has recently been placed on a much sounder legis­
lative basis, allowing for greater participation by black 
communities. The financial provision for the new local authorities 
has yet to be clarified, however, many months since the legis­
lation was promulgated. The very low poll in the most recent 
African local government elections demonstrated very clearly 
that ordinary people are as yet unconvinced about the merits 
of the system.
African housing in the common area, and in most of the urban 
areas in the homelands is another key problem area.; The 
shortage of housing is calculated to be anything up to almost 
600 000 units. The expansion of housing is bedevilled by shortages 
of land and of serviced sites, reluctance by building societies 
to grant loans to Africans who cannot enjoy normal freehold 
tenure, the high cost of loan finance, severe financial constraints 
on the state and the fact that homes of an official minimum
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standard are beyond the means of most ordinary employed 
Africans. The solution to this problem requires some bold 
new thinking.
In a modern industrial state education is the main road to 
progress, occupational advancement and material improvement.
The critical significance of education is keenly recognised by 
blacks. In the survey research conducted for the Buthelezi 
Commission, a sample of over 800 people in the Transvaal and 
Natal were asked what things the government should do to 
"improve the lives of Africans today". They ranked equality 
of education first, ahead of encouraging higher incomes and 
abolishing influx control, and well ahead of curbing price 
rises, the franchise, improved housing provision and the re­
lease of black leaders from prison. For whites and the autho­
rities, the ongoing boycotts and disruption of African schools 
also highlight the keynote significance of education. One is 
aware that the government has made considerable effort to 
upgrade African education since 1976 but in recent years the 
pass rates in the standard 10 and matriculation examinations 
have dropped steadily down to 48 and 10 percent respectively 
last year. The reasons are complex and the whole issue is 
highly problematic but one certainly cannot anticipate any 
significant improvement in the next few years.
Finally in this short list of problems one arrives at political 
rights for Africans. The absence of any real progress in regard 
to constitutional rights for Africans has been underscored 
by the recent extension of parliamentary franchise of a type 
to coloured and Indian people only. In a statement in Race 
Relations News made just before the Referendum on the new dis­
pensation among whites, I conceded that the new constitution had 
aspects of considerable significance for change. I also 
expressed the view, however, that for those people taking a 
broader view of South Africa's critical needs for stability 
and change it could not be supported unless the government were 
to at least issue a clear statement of intent about constitutional
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rights for Africans in the central legislature.
On numerous occasions the government has referred to ongoing 
investigations, consultations and planning by a Cabinet 
committee. It has not once, to the best of my knowledge, 
given the assurance that Africans have a right to some form 
of representation at the central level of government in the 
Republic. This omission has led to a wide-spread mobilisation 
of black opinion against the new constitution and has contributed, 
to very low polls in the recent coloured and Indian elections.
It has also provided an opportunity for a vote against South 
Africa in the Security Council of the United Nations and has 
allowed a range of organisations abroad to claim that apartheid 
is strengthened by the recent constitutional developments.
These are the key issues: educational opportunity, freedom
of movement, the provision of opportunities for shelter, partici­
pation and the recognition of basic rights to citizenship.
They are the issues on which our progress in reform will be 
judged. What are the prospects for change in these areas?
2. Change: the Prospects in the Short to Medium Term.
In attempting to answer the question posed above two basic 
points must be made at the outset. The first is that in any 
society in which the state retains cohesion, the loyalty of 
key personnel and the ability to control most major resources 
one should not readily anticipate revolution nor a moral conversion 
or sweeping, fearful reform from the government. The South 
African state may have problems of international credibility 
and internal acceptability among most blacks, there may be 
widespread youth dissidence and the government may also have 
enormous fiscal and financial problems to solve but we would 
be foolish to imagine that it is losing its grip. It has 
enormous unused reserves of power to control and coerce if 
necessary and it knows how to use them. No dissidence over
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the past 10 years has gained the peak of commitement from 
adult blacks that one saw in the finally unsuccessful 
"defiance campaign" of the' late fifties, when the South 
African state was much weaker and less skilled in the control 
of dissidence.
Writing in a recent issue of Optima Simon Jenkins, political 
editor of The Economist makes much the same point rather more 
crisply. The imagery of the inevitability of revolution in 
South Africa has been so powerful that "all normal standards of 
political analysis were abandoned. - - - The suggestion that 
white rule in South Africa is not imminently doomed is therefore 
treated not as a political judgement, but as an admission of
original sin - --  By failing to disentangle moral feelings
from proper analysis, Western observers produced predictions 
that were simply wrong". Jenkins' applies a more rigorous 
analysis and concludes that "It is now abundantly clear that 
what is now termed the white tribe of Africa will be in rough 
and ready control of South Africa for the foreseeable future".
Cold, realistic analysis would suggest that change strategies 
which assume an imminent collapse of white authority are either 
futile or in some cases counter-productive. It is also only 
realistic to accept that most if not all of the change which 
the government introduces will be of a strategic kind, aimed 
at resolving inconsistencies or contradictions which affect 
its adiminstration, efficiency or credibility among its own 
supporters or groups on which it is dependent. Each successive 
individual reform of this type can quite easily and justifiably 
be labelled as an attempt to stabilise the situation or to 
co-opt new support groups. The significance of such change 
lies not in its moral import, but rather in its cumulative 
effect. As a state manipulates its environment in this way 
it creates new precedents with each successive reform. This, 
after all, is how human rights and democracy emerged in the 
West; a process by which ruling classes absorbed more and
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more groups and strata into their broader sphere of interests.
This view is not a denial of basic differences of interests 
between groups or of the salience of conflict in society. It 
is simply to state the obvious historical truth that conflict 
has frequently been absorbed rather than resolved in open 
antagonism. One can expect therefore, that every specific 
reform in South Africa will be seen by those not included in 
it as a strategic ploy to strengthen the system of white domin­
ation. I have no doubt that if we avoid a revolution we could 
well see a day on which a multi-racial cabinet will appoint a 
black Vice-President amidst howls of outrage at the latest 
"trick" of the white ruling class. I am not defending this 
possibility -- it is simply an often repeated historical pre­
cedent elsewhere which we should be mindful of.
Hence, the fact that the state is presently attempting to 
"co-opt" coloured and Indian moderates into its sphere of 
interest is by no means a sign of any change of heart on the 
part of the government, but equally it is also by no means 
the last group it will co-opt.
The second basic point I wish to make follows from (or perhaps 
precedes) the first. This is that no matter how faulty or fit­
ful the reform performance of the South African state has been, 
it has in recent years demonstrated the kind of pragmatism and 
instrumental rationality necessary for change to be possible 
under its rule. The changes in labour legislation following 
the Wiehahn Commission in 1979 and the subsequent emergence of an 
officially acknowledged and potentially very powerful new union 
movement have demonstrated this. The shift in the way urban 
Africans in the common area are viewed is another example.
While no political consequences at anything other than the 
local level have flowed from this, the change from the view of 
these Africans as temporary sojourners whose townships have to 
be kept rudimentary lest the Africans flock towards the "honey 
pots" to the present acceptance of Africans as a permanent
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population in "white" areas is a significant shift.
Incomplete as all this may be, it at least demonstrates the 
possibility of a process of change which could yield substantial 
reform in the future. The old notion so typical of the Verwoerd 
era of a granite-like resistance to any change or deviation 
from an established poltical charter is simply no longer relevant.
Given these two basic viewpoints it might be expected that I 
will proceed to predict a process of accumulating reform in 
the short to medium term future, albeit very instrumental 
and directed at stabilising the conditions under which white 
privilege operates. Not so at all. There are particular 
impediments in the way of reform which will be very resistant 
to the logic I have sketched above. The first concerns the 
perceived role of Afrikaners and of whites as a group in our 
future society and the second concerns some very basic values 
about the kind of society we are^and to some equally basic 
anxieties which whites experience. I will relate these 
impediments to the critical areas for reform which were identi­
fied earlier.
2-1 Impediments to Change: Ethnic Mobilisation and
Constitutional Possibilities
The changes which have taken place over the last decade have 
not impinged on the key political interests of the government. 
This is its power advantage as an organised Afrikaner estab­
lishment. All the constitutional proposals which have emanated
from the government thusfar have one key feature in common ---
the protection of the séparate basis for ethnic political 
organisation by Afrikaners in co-operation with other white 
supporters. There is no sign whatsoever that this structure 
is open to negotiation.
The major question which arises is whether or not this 
structure of political interest is synonymous with white
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or Afrikaner domination. It certainly is at the present time 
but need not necessarily always remain so. Ethnic parties 
can form coalitions with other formations as we have seen in 
the Hertzog-Smuts government and in the Nationalist party - 
Labour party coalition of earlier times. More generally, the 
amount of power wielded by an ethnic formation is probably 
more negotiable than the political structures which guarantee 
its survival, coherance and significance in the policy.
What I am saying is that the National party is more likely 
to negotiate some degree of power sharing in which it retains 
its political identity and role than it is ever likely to 
negotiate around any arrangements which imply that it could 
become simply another party among many others without any guaran­
teed role in the legislative process. Put differently, whites as 
individuals can be offered as many guarentees of security and 
the protection of their interests as one can think of, but 
without the organised Afrikaner political formation being offererd 
some formal role in the polity such guarentees will have little 
effect.
The new constitution, for example, has been designed 
around this fundamental interest. It could, of course, fail 
miserably, leaving nothing but white domination again, but 
it could lead to a National party - Labour party governing 
coalition which might involve substantial power concessions 
from whites.
2-2 Education: Seperate Cannot be Equal
Nunerous investigations and analyses have made it quite
clear that the black educational system is becoming
increasingly overstressed. Between 1973 and 1983 there was
a 1 200% increase in the number of African pupils in the final
year at high school. Given the fact that African education suffers
from a vicious circle of personnel deficiencies (poor results = few suitable
10.
teacher-training students = shortage of qualified teachers = 
poor results) aggravated by poor facilities and resources, 
incremental improvements in funding and resource-provision 
may not even keep pace with the increasing stress on the system.
What is required is a structural change in the system whereby 
the resources, expertise and even some personnel in the edu­
cational systems for the more advantaged groups become avail­
able for the upgrading of African education. This implies 
a degree of integration of the different educational systems.
This comes into direct conflict with anothfer basic principle 
in South African socio-political organisation as defined by 
most whites; this being ethnic community autonomy and separa­
tion. The school is one of the most valued and protected of 
community institutions and quite obviously great resistance to 
any moves to integrate schools can be expected. In fact the 
government's unwillingness to introduce even simply a single 
administering body for the seperate systems, as recommended 
by the De Lange investigation, is a measure of the sensitivity 
of the issue.
The question arises, however, as to whether or not critically 
needed reform in African education has to wait for this very 
large socio-political impediment to dissipate. Are there not 
ways in which the different educational systems can pool and 
share resources and personnel while retaining their identity? 
One possibility is academic and technical high schools for 
blacks established jointly by the various education authorities 
as speical projects. Another possibility is adult education 
centres for after hours black students run jointly by the 
different authorities.
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2-3 African housing and Influx Control: First World or Third 
World Solutions
South Africa is a "settler society" in which the European 
component has become just as identified with the sub-continent 
as in the case of any other former settler society like the 
USA, Argentine or Australia. As with those countries, the 
dominant perception of the new society by the former settler 
communities is that it is what historians have called a 
"fragment" of the European societies or origin. In fact, 
the mental images of the former settlers is that their society 
is an improved version of Europe in its life styles, planning 
and traditions. This very deeply established collective mental 
model of the society impinges directly on any attempts to 
solve the housing crisis for Africans and to liberalise influx 
control, in addition to the socio-political considerations 
already discussed.
The huge backlog of African housing provision in :and around 
our cities and the problem of accommodating more African rural- 
urban migrants under a rational urbanisation policy can both 
only be resolved if whites and the authorities are prepared to 
adopt a radically different view of the character of South 
African cities and to see them in part at least as Third world 
cities, which they are. Very basic self-help housing with a 
minimum of basic facilities, the recognition of an informal 
sector operating inside the cities with roadside market stalls 
and even the recognition of informal residents' associations as 
a form of local authority are the keys to the solution of 
otherwise untractable problems. These types of systems are much 
spoken about today, but are not as yet accepted by the cross- 
section of officialdom concerned. Even when spoken or written 
sbout, the models which are presented are frequently a concession 
to "western standards" and hence are too elaborate or expensive 
to provide the large-scale solutions which are required.
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There is also much evidence of a collective white fear of any 
concentration of Africans near white spheres of influence which 
is not administered and controlled along very orderly lines.
The African "compound" of earlier times is still a value-model 
in the minds of most whites.
This is all very ironic in the light of the fact that from the 
mid nineteen-fifties onwards the majority of our worst and most 
noticable social disruptions have taken place in the meticulously 
controlled and very "western" environments of the black schools 
and planned black townships. These contradictions have not 
tarnished the symbolism in the minds of whites, however.
2-4 Whose Interests?
The impediments to reform which I have identified are what one 
may term socio-political or socio-cultural values and interests. 
This does not mean that material factors like class interests do 
not feature in my model of conflict. The specific class interests 
of owners and managers in industry can be and are pursued in a 
variety of policy contexts, however, and there is no longer a 
discernable capitalist interest in segregation, constrained 
urbanisation or exclusive white political domination. There is, 
obviously, a capitalist interest in stability in our society, 
but this is so widely shared with other white interest groups 
that it cannot be specifically called a capitalist concern, 
particularly since the alternative to white rule is not necessarily 
socialist rule. Some industrial management may also avoid 
contradicting the authorities for fear of running into operating 
problems or losing state contracts. None of these motives appear 
to reflect a significant capitalist interest in maintaining race 
segregation and race separation as policies, however.
There is, however, one "class" which has its interests admirably 
served in the present structure of our socio-political system.
It is also a "class" with far greater coherence and internal 
communication and a clearer focus of interests than capitalists
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in South Africa today. This is the bureaucratic class which as 
we know is very large in South Africa compared with most other 
non-socialist societies.
Planned and closely administered systems represent distinct 
spheres of opportunity for bureaucrats (often called "empires) 
and obviously the more separation there is along ethnic lines, 
the more "empires" can exist. These comments are a little unfair 
because some of the most dedicated and skilled functionaries 
I know are public sector bureaucrats. Nevertheless, alternative 
systems have some very real implications for the bureaucratic 
establishment which can never be overlooked in change analysis.
3. Reform Strategy: the Challenges
What the points made above suggest to me is that change and 
reform is probably not going to be an evenly accumulating or 
steady incremental process in our country. Some reforms of a 
substantial kind have occurred and they have demonstrated a 
certain rationality in our policy system. These reforms, however, 
have brought us closer to what one may term the "crunch issues" 
referred to earlier as basic impediments. The new constitutional 
dispensation is the clearest case in point.
The legitimacy of the new constitution (to its architects at 
least) lies in its demographic base, reflected in the proportions 
of MP's in the separate chambers, giving the well-known ratio"s 
of roughly 4:2:1. This arrangement both represents numbers of 
people and, no matter how it mutates internally, provides a 
powerful guarantee that a dominant white party will be able to 
protect its power position and its basis of mobilisation. Obviously 
the same legitimating formula cannot be extended to Africans; 
not even urban Africans, who clearly outnumber whites. Alter­
native legitimating formulae are not easy to find and therefore 
we cannot expect that Africans will be offered an incorporation 
similar to that for coloureds and Indians once the present system 
has settled down and new pressures to incorporate Africans have 
built up. There will probably be a hiatus in the political reform 
process.
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Have the opposition or change-orientated formations, both formal 
and informal, inside and outside South Africa, the energy and 
the strategy to work against the type of impediment I have out­
lined? I will not attempt a comprehensive assessment but some 
evaluation is necessary, under the following headings:
3-1 Sabotage and Insurgency
Countries abroad like Israel, Ulster and certain Latin American 
States have demonstrated a capacity to endure very high levels of 
insurgency. Given this fact as well as the sophisticated counter­
insurgency in South Africa, the new peace accords with neighbour 
states which insulate the borders to some extent and the fact 
that in order to become more effective sabotage also has to 
become more brutal and less attractive to internal supporters, 
then this form of pressure does not appear likely to be very 
effective in producing change, whether peaceful or bloody. In 
fact, a certain level of sabotage may even be indirectly functional 
for white rule since it creates a unity of sentiment and purpose 
among whites.
3-2 Economic Embargoes
There is clearly increasing activism in pursuit of external 
disinvestment, trade boycotts and other economic pressures in 
the USA in particular. If successful such programmes could 
reduce South Africa's access to new technology, marginally reduce 
our rate of economic growth and undermine confidence in the 
economy externally and internally. The success of such programmes 
will never be substantial, however, since alternative capital 
and markets for products are usually available even if on less 
attractive terms and therefore possibly inflationary in impact. 
Certain internal consequences are of greater importance, however.
Strong external pressures usually have the effect of mobilising 
support around a strong, patriotic government. Whites will become
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more united and more solidary. As the economy suffers .black unemployment 
will rise, robbing the new union movements of some of their leverage. 
People who are unemployed for a long time tend to sink back into 
an obsession with material survival, and political apathy, with 
the exception of the youth whose parents support them.
The South African State has clear priorities and in contrast to 
the dwindling resources among blacks, it will mobilise its resources 
and shift emphasis from non-essential expenditure to security ;/ 
affairs and perhaps even institute state subsidisation of various 
kinds of strategic production.
The disinvestment and external boycott strategy probably can be 
calculated to have what one could call a U effect. When pressures 
are mild to moderate it probably has a moral effect which is positive 
for change. As pressures become more intense and more effective 
in hurting the -South African economy, however, internal black 
resources are weakened and a more unified white establishment 
will mobilise against the pressures. From here on the strategy, 
in order to regain effectiveness, has to press through in an attempt 
to cause an economic and political collapse in South Africa.' This, 
obviously, is the effect that some of the more active protagonists 
of disinvestment and boycott would like to see. There are two 
problems, however. Firstly the extreme effect is very unlikely 
to be achieved. Secondly in its more advanced form it is not1 
a reform strategy but one aimed at violent revolution since it 
would by then already have forced the government and the white 
establishment into a no-compromise, back-to-the-wall survival 
orientation which could only be broken by total revolution.
3.3 "Hot" Internal Opposition
The archetype of what I term "hot" internal opposition was the 
defiance campaign and its aftermath of the late fifties and early 
sixties. It has some parallels today in aspects of the anti-election 
campaigns, rent demonstrations, school boycotts and the like.
It has its active side and also its symbolic side in which "hot"
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rhetoric accompanies or takes the place of confrontations and 
active demonstrations.
In South Africa outbreaks of this more intense opposition are 
only to be expected and are quite understandable given the general 
lack of response to milder forms of protest. Hot rhetoric also 
has its functions in a change process since it offers more moderate 
reform action a certain degree of protection (the latter appears 
much more constructive in contrast).
There are, however, certain features of this type of action which 
have negative consequences. Firstly, the demonstrations are usually 
of a type which invite counter-reaction by the police and the 
authorities. There are few governments in the world which will 
tolerate civil disobediance if it can lead to violence or damage to 
property. Given the overwhelming strength of the security apparatus 
in South Africa such demonstrations are likely to be crushed sooner 
or later. For the ordinary participants and the rank-and-file 
spectators in the black townships this course of events m$y reinforce 
the impression that the system is too powerful to oppose. Defeat 
after intense mobilisation and demonstrations can also very easily 
demoralise the rank-and-file participants. In other words this 
type of action is not able to be sustained.
Secondly, the tendency as in many countries in the world today 
is for participants in such demonstrations to be younger adults, 
school leavers and even school children, not only in school boycotts 
but also in rent and bus strikes. This has recently been the 
case once again in disturbances in Lamontville, Chesterville and 
most recently in the Vaal Triangle, where there was considerable 
loss of life. The high visibility of youth and, with some exceptions, 
the relative inactivity of the older householders has some problems. 
Such action lends itself easily to the accusations that gullible 
and restless young people are being exploited for political ends.
The demonstrations themselves suffer a loss of credibility ---
young people, for example, do not have to pay the rents they are
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they are protesting about. To the extent that the demonstrators 
prevent the more mature adults from getting to work, tensions 
can be created between generations in the black communities, which 
were in ample evidence in the 1976 demonstrations when migrant 
workers attacked youthful demonstrators. In other words these 
demonstrations seldom reflect community mobilisation around issues 
and strategies which can involve a sustained, community-wide response.
Thirdly, where such types of demonstrations occur on a widespread 
basis and achieve a high visibility in the media (which is presumably 
in line with the goals of the organisers) they can create a reaction 
among whites which is not supportive of reform. An analysis of 
white voter preferences on the basis of opinion polls reported 
in Indicator SA3 Vol 1, No 2 1983 shows clearly that the 1976 
township disturbances were associated with a fall-off in support 
for the Progressive Federal Party among whites and a swing of 
English speaking voters to the National Party.
Taking these factors into consideration leads one to question 
whether "hot" resistance of this type within the present South 
African context achieves anywhere near an effect on change which 
warrants the risks and loss of life which is so often involved.
3-4 Constituency or Community Mobilisation
There are few examples of this to refer to in change strategies, 
but what there are indicate that there are fairly dynamic possibilities 
for change in this type of response. One example, by analogy in a sense, 
is to be found in the new union movement which mobilised from 1972 
onwards. By definition there was a clear constituency, the African 
industrial worker. Recruitment and mobilisation took place on the 
basis of issues which made sense to the vast majority of potential 
members — wages, working conditions and disciplinary procedures in 
industry. There was relatively great concern with matters of organ­
isation and education of members, and although organisational problems 
have always been present, the organisational coherence established has 
been sufficient to the tasks of the movement. The goals which were 
set were achievable in a sufficient number of cases to support the
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mounting credibility of the movement. Political connections with 
revolutionary movements were avoided or played down. The arena of 
action was within an established institutional framework or nexus 
(industry, the state Department of Labour, etc) which provided 
possibilities of formal recognition from the outset. Most 
importantly, perhaps, the demands made were negotiable; they were 
not so large as to invite committed total rejection from the outset. 
Despite active government opposition to union organisation in the 
early stages, with bannings and harrassment, the credibility of the 
movement won through within a few years so that eventually the 
government itself decided to take the matter seriously enough to 
appoint the Wiehahn Commission, out of which formal recognition 
of the emergent union movement resulted.
Another model of response is Inkatha. This organisation is em­
broiled in great controversy with the UDF at present but there 
is no need to debate those specific problems at this point.
What is relevant to this discussion is simply the basic model of 
action. This organisation is also linked in with a formal 
institutional framework (the non-independent KwaZulu regional 
government), although it extends beyond it into township organisation 
in the Transvaal, for example. The formal institutional framework 
creates possibilities of recognition by and negotiation with the 
authorities. The major strategy, however, is very large mass member­
ship, currently standing at a claimed figure of 980 000. The effects 
of mass membership on the credibility of the organisation and on the 
respect or caution which it is likley to engender in central govern­
ment are obvious. The major political demands of the organisation, 
although hitherto rejected by the government, are also not so 
unrealistic or large as to be non-negotiable at some future date. 
There are obviously possibilities in this type of strategy as well 
which will be referred to presently.
Although it seems curious to say this at the present time of school 
boycotts and scattered township disturbances, there is really very 
little effective African pressure for change on the government
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of a type to which the government is likely to be able to respond.
The pressures that do exist are such that if the government were 
to respond it would seem to be rewarding civil disruption. Such 
pressures have to be very large indeed before any government can 
be expected to grant any concessions. The two examples of constituency 
based mobilisation given above would suggest that community pressure 
of a more effective type is possible. Apart from current political 
symbolism among progressive movements (which is not necessarily 
functional) there is no major reason which I can discern as to 
why the new African local government system in the urban areas 
could not provide an institutional framework within which community- 
based parties could mobilise and formulate demands for negotiation.
At the present time the public representatives enjoy little popular 
credibility (the polls in the last election were around 10 percent) 
and given the low support base, the local councillors can easily 
be manipulated by the authorities for their own interests. If 
there was constituency organisation and community-based public 
vigilance, however, the local councillors could become as relevant 
to African community life as trade unions are to African industrial 
l i f e .
These proposals as well as the argument that Inkatha may have 
the structural basis for a successful strategy are likely to be 
regarded as akin to heresy by popular thinking in most liberal 
and radical opposition ranks. Collaboration with the system has 
become stigmatised as reflecting not only strategic misjudgement
but moral turpitude of the worst order. This attitude is perfectly 
understandable for an organisation committed to the violent overthrow 
of the government, but is less understandable among liberals and 
among people whose thinking is sufficiently sophisticated tp realise 
that an overthrow of the South African government is a fairly 
remote option at this stage.
One must concede that mobilisation around state institutions 
like local authorities and non-independant homeland governments
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involves certain fairly serious risks. The greatest risk is that 
the participants will be drawn into activities and commitments 
which will give credibility to government policy. Another serious 
risk is that the the government will manipulate the participants in 
such a way as to serve its own policy ends in the long run. These 
risks cannot be taken lightly.
The fact that I have emphasised constituency mobilisation, however, 
to my mind-is a counter is these risks. Here again the emergent 
trade unions are illustrative. Some of these unions have elected 
to work within the institutional framework of the Industrial Council 
system and most of the umions use formal state institutions like 
the Industrial Court. Throughout the industrial west, but particularly 
in centrally planned economies, tráde unions face a constant risk 
of becoming incorporated in such a way as to stabilise industrial 
relations at the cost of popular worker interests. Trade unions 
as"Junior partners" of management are always possible when the 
organisations become bureaucratic and formalised. The fact that 
so many unions in the west have avoided ; this role, however, 
is due in large measure to pressure and vigilance from the organised 
popular constituency.
Using the leverage offered by formal institutions is always like 
walking a tightrope. Without the balancing rod of an organised 
constituency it is indeed hazardous. With the support and vigilance 
of organised constituents, however, this strategy may be one of 
the few courses to peaceful but significant change available in 
South Africa today. The stereotyping of this alternative as a 
sellout to government interests is a piece of superficial opposition 
wisdom which needs serious logical inspection.
3-5 Protest, Communication and Negotiation
We come here to a range of activities traditionally engaged in 
by change organisation, icnluding churches, voluntary associations, 
business organisations, the press and academics. Protest activity is
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as old as modern politics in South Africa and by common agreement has 
generally not been significantly effective in influencing successive 
governments. There is no doubt, however, that the effectiveness of this 
type of communicaiton is probably increased by the following (The concepts 
of protest, communication and negotiation are used simultaneously since 
they overlap extensively):
* the credibility of the information presented as an argument 
for change. This highlights the need for rigorous research 
and fact-finding. Credible information carried with it
an intrinsic legitimacy which will move politicians to 
caution, if nothing else;
* the credibility and support of the organisation doing the 
protesting or communication. Hence a strong editorial in
a large national newspaper is more effective than a pamphlet 
produced by a small voluntary organisation. Furthermore, 
when a large organisation protests, that communication will 
lack effectiveness if it is perceived to be outside the 
scope of its competance or if the memberhip is not seen 
to be fully behind the protest. The South African Council 
of Churches, for example, is probably not as effective in 
protest as many would like it to be because conservative 
audiences doubt whether the mass of affiliated church 
members are committed in their support of the protest.
The Urban Foundation, on the other hand, was established 
expressly for the purpose of improving the quality of 
black life and its communications are generally perceived 
to have the full backing of the business community which 
sponsors it;
* protest and communication will gain effectiveness if it 
is seen to be aligned with or supported by some other 
organisation or formation which has credibility. A 
community protest,i'for example, would enjoy increased 
weight if backed by a trade union federation;
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* protesters are easily discredited if their bona-fides 
can be questioned. Where a protest is mounted by a group 
known to have a much wider or far-reaching political agenda, 
that protest will have less effect. Organisations which 
see protest and/or communication as their main means of 
achieving an effect should therefore avoid becoming 
associated or linked with organisations with more sweeping 
goals. For this reasons there is great merit in an 'organisation 
taking opportunities to reassure the government of its bona 
fides, no matter how tough its protests may be. Personal 
communication with the authorities is obviously beneficial, 
since communication across a wide gulf of misunderstandings
must obviously be futile;
* the framework within which communication takes place is 
of very great significance. The authorities tend to see 
issues within a framework of bureaucratic rules which are 
imposed by their role. If an item of communication suggests 
that the framework is irrelevant then obviously they will 
ignore it. A piece of communication must acknowledge the 
framework and then provide a motivation as to why the rules 
should be bent or the framework widened;
* where the communicating or protesting organistion has 
something to offer then a form of negotiation and/or 
mediation becomes possible. An organisation may enjoy 
effective contacts and credibility both with the authorities 
and in a black community and may be able to either act as
an intermediary or negotiate on behalf of one of the parties. 
There are numerous situations in South Africa in which mediation 
could serve a vital purpose and could have enormously beneficial 
effects. Organisations which see scope for this type of 
role for themselves have to try to ensure that they maintain 
some credibility on both sides of the official fences.
These seem to me to be a few basic rules applicable in the sphere 
of activity which has come to be known colloquially as the "change 
industry". These suggested rules are not easy to follow in practice.
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Enormously strong and subtle pressures are placed on organisations 
to distantiate themselves symbolically either from the authorities 
or from the black opposition formations. People or organisations 
who do not do so are quickly labelled as "sellouts" or "activists". 
Speaking for a moment specifically in regard to the South Africa 
Institute of Race Relations, my own view is that sumbolic politics 
have to be respected but resisted. An organisation in our position 
which throws its whole lot in with one party or another either becomes 
a victim itself or joins the establishment. Either way, given the 
realities of the situation, it loses a great deal of effect.
4. Conclusions and Thoughts on a Framework for Democratic Change
The title of this assessment is "The Carrot or the Stick".
The foregoing analysis of change strategies has suggested that some 
of the sticks with the most lethal appearance may not be as effective 
as some forms of popular wisdom assume. If sustained, constituency- 
based and possibly institutionalised pressure on the system can be 
regarded as a stick, however, then at least one type of stick Should 
be used which has not beem employed sufficiently. Protest and change- 
orientated communication is not really in the category of sticks; 
the evaluation above suggests that the more it looks like a stick 
the less effective it may be (although the carrot may need a sharp 
point). Negotiation and mediation always involve carrots and their 
effect, I believe, can be great. These carrots are extremely difficult 
to grow, however. Briefly, then, I have concluded that both the carrot 
and the stick are required, provided the sticks are not simply flailed 
around wildly at a distance or mainly by vulnerable schoolchildren and 
unemployed youths.
More seriously, I have concluded that there are indeed aspects 
of symbolic politics in South Africa which are counter-productive.
Since my analysis has probably already made me unpopular with both 
conservatives and more progessive elements, I would like to risk 
even greater unpopularity by concluding with a few thoughts which 
challenge holy cows on both sides.
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Very fundamentally the politics of protest and change in South 
Africa has been the politics of estrangement, more often than 
not operating outside a framework which could allow some dialogue, 
albeit tough, with the government. Extra-parliamentary oppositions 
in South Africa have as a consequence been at great risk of drifting 
off into empty rhetoric, violent posturing or apathy.
One of the main reasons for this is that these oppositions have 
had to reject totally the framework for policy formation employed 
by the government. At the root of this rejection lie two goals of 
the government which are totally non-negotiable to the vast majority 
of those black people who find themselves ranged behind extra- 
parliamentary opposition. These two goals are "ethnicity" and 
'denationalisation". In rejecting these the extra-parliamentary 
opposition groupings have also rejected all structures which give 
form to these goals, like homeland government, black urban authorities, 
the Presidents' Council and the like. The result has been impasse 
and total lack of communication.
My assessment of the situation in its widest reality is that the 
approach can be modified. One can reject imposed ethnicity and 
the denationalisation of Africans implied by homeland independence 
without necessarily totally rejecting all government institutions.
Today there are more and more voices in the government camp which 
question the realism of an ethnic solution and of the permanent 
denial of full citizenship to Africans. These influences, however, 
are not prepared to retract every policy initiative that has occurred 
so far and are not prepared to retract on the goals of Afrikaner 
ethnic politics. In regard to some of the structures which have 
been created in terms of policy, there are also the interests of 
the very powerful bureaucracy to consider, as mentioned previously.
Non-independent homeland government, for example, has been conceived 
of as a stage in the process of denationalisation. If the ultimate
ft
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objective of independence is firmly excluded, however, this form 
of government can be seen in a totally different light; as a form 
of decentralised regional government for areas of the country where 
different tenure systems and types of local government exist 
(tribal authorities). Denationalisation through independence may 
be a non-negotiable element but the regional devolution of state 
authority is almost universally regarded as a positive political 
trend, bringing government closer to the people. If one accepts 
regional government in this context and is prepared to acknowledge 
some of the very real achievements of Pretoria in establishing 
these functioning authorities then one has one carrot to offer 
the government. This would be on the clear understanding, however, 
that the goal of national alienation as achieved in independence 
is totally unacceptable. Thus there needs to be a much more 
vigorous debate about the future of the non-independent homelands, 
in which a position is developed accepting the relevance of the 
regional legislative structures but without accepting those structures 
as longer run alternatives to participation in the government of 
the Republic as a whole. The tendency among some opposition groups 
and overseas governments to eschew contact with non-independent 
homelands actually assists in the process of denationalisation because 
without support and political allies the homeland politicans become 
more vulnerable to the blandishments offered by the South African 
government in attempts to encourage the acceptance of independence.
More broadly, there is another context in which both non-independent 
regional authorities and the African local authorities can be seen. 
Democracy is problematic in Africa, not because of anything to do 
with Africans themselves but inter alia because the level of social 
and economic mobilisation and differentiation in the African 
societies is very low. The lack of organisation and differentiation 
means that there is little in typical African countries to constrain 
and check strong central authority. There is very little in the way 
of structures of participation between the mass of peasants and 
workers and the central political apparatus.
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In South Africa this problem could be minimised in our future 
constitutional development if African local government and regional 
government could become strong and viable as lower tiers in a 
national constitutional structure. The interests of different 
local and regional formations are potentially sufficiently distinc­
tive to provide for one of the important bases of democracy - 
"cross cutting cleavages" and a variety of competing socio-political 
structures. The holy cow of "one man one vote in a unitary system" 
must be confronted with the fact that it is neither the most common 
democratic system in the West and nor is it the most responsive 
to the needs of the communities.
One of the constitutional issues which will dominate debate over 
the next five years will be how to incorporate Africans into the 
parliamentary system. If the suggestion is made forcefully and 
often enough that it could be done effectively and with positive 
consequences .for a future democracy by allowing representation to 
come to the centre via local and regional government then many people 
within the government camp may consider it more seriously. It will 
at least have the character of a demand around which negotiation is 
possible since it will avoid the connotations of a possible swamping 
of minority-group parties by concerted mass voting by the African 
majority.
Two reassurances are perhaps necessary. It will not be a system of 
representation in perpetuity. With African representation at the 
centre an interim constitutional arrangement would obviously mutate 
over time. It might be a form of transitional representation that a 
deeply diyided society needs in order to narrow the conflict between 
groups. Secondly the suggestion excludes nobody. If accompanied 
by reassurances on African citizenship even progressive organisations 
may find it feasible to participate. Participation by such organ­
isations is highly doubtful if viewed in a present context but 
political strategies are very fluid. In this connection it might be 
relevant to note that the P.L.O has no hesitation in participating 
in Arab local authority elections in Israel and the IRA similarly 
puts up candidates for elections in Ulster; both instances where
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the political structures are captive of state authorities which are 
opposed by such organisations. There seems to be an undue sensitivity 
about participating in government structures in South Africa which 
may be counter-productive. The explanations for this are complex 
and not appropriately dealt with in this analysis. Suffice it to 
say, however, that the typical stances adopted in South Africa are 
in many ways counter productive.
Afrikaner ethnicity is the other major issue. If it is recognised 
that change to a more democratic society may be unduly protracted 
and could ultimately demand large scale bloodshed if formally protected 
Afrikaner ethnic interests are dismissed as inappropriate to a 
future South Africa, then it is only functional to take account of 
these interests in change strategies. South Africa would not 
by any means be the first country in which cultural or religious 
group interests have been formally or semi-formally built into a 
constitution. Belgium, the Netherlands, Lebanon, Austria, Canada, 
Nigeria and others exist or have existed to prove the utility of 
this element in the constitutions of divided societies. Here again 
there is a "non-negotiable" from the other side, however.
Constitutional acknowledgement of the interests of one ethnic group 
does not mean that ethnic identity has to be imposed on other groups.
It is the imposition of ethnic identity which is the factor which 
produces such dangerous alienation in our society and this has to 
be forcefully conveyed to the government.
I see a need, therefore, for those organisations pressing for the 
extension of the franchise to all South Africans to at least indicate 
what types of constitutional concessions to white group interests 
they might be prepared to make. Part of the impasse in South 
Africa lies in the fact that there is so little real debate taking 
place between the government and change organisations on these vital 
constitutional issues. There are constitutional options which 
combine an open democratic form with the protection of group interests 
for those ethnic groups which insist on such protection.
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In conclusion I would like to point out that our greatest danger to 
peaceful conflict resolution in South Africa lies in the fact that 
the government with only few exceptions does not recognise black 
community leadership with sufficient popular support and legitimacy 
to represent and exercise control over black community action.
Blame for this can in large measure be laid at the door of the 
government. At the same time, however, it must also be conceded 
that much of the leadership which claims legitimacy and the alleg­
iance of black communities is not elected and often self-appointed. 
Any government will hesitate to recognise leaders whose only claim 
to legitimacy is their rhetorical stance and sometimes their 
association with dissident factions of unknown size. For these 
reasons a peaceful resolution of our conflicts requires a change 
of attitude both on the part of the government and on the part of 
community leaders who hitherto have not exposed themselves to a 
process of community choice.
Of all the factors which weaken the thrust for change and reform 
in our society, however, perhaps the most important is the waving 
of small sticks by small groups or large sticks at a distance, 
while shouting messages which convey non-negotiable demands. This 
statement perhaps makes me sound like a wishy-washy conciliator.
I would also add, however, that the greatest and most effective 
pressure for change will come from the black people themselves 
when they are organised into cohesive communities and constituencies 
with practical and clearly legitimate demands which cannot be dis­
missed as agitation. More pressure, not less, is required, but it 
must be tough pressure of the right kind.
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